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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES'

agency should serve decent business practice. It would be highly
undesirable if insanity or the adjudication thereof made a power to
confess a judgment unavailable. In the principal case the judgment
was entered long before the sale was made under the order of
the county court.
It does not appear that the conservator of George F. I-Toots
was served with notice to appear in circuit court at the time of entering the judgment. One may venture to think that this was not done
since no mention is made and since the judgment was taken "in vacation." No ruling as to the necessity for this has been found. It
would be an added protection if it were required."
If Hoots had died it is stated in the opinion under review that
no judgment could have been taken against him. It is not believed
that the court meant by this that the power would have been revoked
by Hoots' death but that in such event it would have been necessary
to have summoned his personal representative into court and to
have taken judgment against him. In Fuller v. Jocelyn' a judgment
was entered against the principal on a warrant of attorney after his
death. This was not known to the court at the time, but was called
to its attention upon motion to set aside the judgment. The court
refused to do so on the unsatisfactory ground that "being the course
of the court to enter the judgments as of the first day of the term,
that
they could not alter it on
7 consideration of the circumstances
attend a particular case."
It is generally, but not universally, held that death does not
end a power of sale in a mortgage." Reilly v. Phillips9 was such a
No
case and in addition the dead mortgagor left minor heirs.
guardian was appointed for them and no notice was given to them
otherwise than by the customary publication. It was held that the
sale under the power was valid.1 0
However closely insanity may resemble death, the analogy is
not aided by the troublesome fiction of "civil death" which was
rejected as a basis for refusing to enter a judgment in Spencer v.
KENNETH C. SEARS.
"Reynolds, supra.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCEss-TAxATION-INHERITANCE TAX ON SHARES IN FOREIGN CORPORATION OWNED BY NON-

DECEDENT- [United States] The case of Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton1 decided by the federal Supreme
Court last spring finally settles a question much mooted in recent
years. One of the alleged grievances of some of our western and
5. Cf. Lundberg v. Davidson (1898) 72 Minn. 49, 74 N.W. 1018 (sale
RESIDENT

under power while mortgagor was insane; guardian ad litem unnecessary).
6. (1730) 2 Strange 882.
7. Cf. Lanning v. Pawson (1861) 38 Pa. 480.
8. Mechem "Agency" sec. 659; Tiffany "Agency" (2d ed.) sec. 88.
9. (1894) 4 S.D. 604, 57 N.W. 780.
10. See Tracey v. Lawrence (1854) 2 Drewry 403. See also Grandin v.
Emmons (1901) 10 N.D. 223, 86 N.W. 723.
1. (1926) 46 S. Ct. 256.
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southern states, in their search for new subjects of taxation, has
been that so much property within their borders was owned by
non-resident stockholders of foreign corporations, thus presenting a
legal situation making difficult the levying of inheritance taxes by
these states upon the death of such stockholders. A typical case was
that of a large New Jersey mining or smelting corporation, whose
productive property was all located in Montana while most of its
stockholders were in New York and other eastern states. Upon the
death of a New York stockholder, New York might levy an inheritance tax upon the transfer of his stock, as might New Jersey, while
Montana, where was located nearly all of the physical property that
gave actual value to the stock, seemed able to profit nothing from
these transfers at death. To meet this situation it was suggested
in the tax offices, of states like Montana that perhaps the courts
might be persuaded to "look through the corporate fiction" dnd discern an interest of the non-resident stockholder in the physical
corporate property within the state, which, under an appropriately
worded statute, could be taxed there at his death.
The theoretical arguments for this view were far from contemptible. In various situations familiar in the law of corporations the
courts have recognized, where necessary to do justice or to enforce
a legislative policy, that a corporation is essentially a form of business organization by means of which associated property interests
may be more conveniently dealt with than under the common-law
categories of individual ownership, but that the stockholder and the
control he (though indirectly) 'exercises over the corporate property
and business are the ultimate realities back of the "corporate entity."
In the interpretation of the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment this reasoning was largely made unnecessary by the
early ruling of the federal Supreme Court that a corporation was
itself a person within the Amendment, so that it could directly
invoke its protection, instead of its stockholders, as "persons," being
required to show that their "property" was "taken" by the confiscation of that of the corporation. 2 But the notable opinion of
Mr. Justice Field on circuit in 1882 ably maintained that:"this has been because the property of a corporation is in fact the
property of the corporators. To deprive the corporation of its property,
or to burden it, is, in fact, to deprive the corporators of their property or to lessen its value. Their interest, undivided though it be, and
constituting only a right during the continuance of the corporation to
participate in its dividends, and on its dissolution to receive a proportionate share of its assets, has an appreciable value, and is property
in a commercial sense, and whatever affects the property of the corporation necessarily affects the commercial value of their interests.
• . . Now, if a statute of the state takes the entire property, who suffers loss by the legislation?' Whose property is taken? Certainly, the
corporation is deprived of its property; but at the same time, in every
2. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co. (1886) 118 U. S.
394, 396.
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guaranty, corporators are also deprived
just sense of the constitutional
3
of their property."
This has never been denied by the Supreme Court, though the
case was affirmed upon other grounds. 4 Indeed, in view of the
comprehensive conception of "property" which has been attributed
to the due process clause in order fairly to extend its protection
to the manifold interests of modem life, it would seem strange to
exclude the interest (indirect though it be) which a stockholder
has in the corporate property through his control over it by means
of the corporate machinery and through the benefit he derives from
its corporate use. "Property" in the constitutional sense cannot be
confined to those categories of "title" or of "ownership" which the
common law had recognized prior to 1868, if due regard is to
be had for the realities of modern social and business relationships.
It may be entirely convenient and proper to require the stockholder
ordinarily and so far as practicable to work out his rights, constitutional or other, through the medium of the corporate form and
machinery, but, however they may be classified or administered,
that they are fundamentally his seems indubitable.
Granted the soundness of this reasoning, cannot the state where
corporate property is physically located recognize the indirect property interest in it of the stockholder, not only for the beneficial
purpose of protection under the due process clauses (state as well
as federal) but for the less welcome purpose of inheritance taxation? In the absence of any other constitutional prohibition, is due
process denied by a state's taxation of any existing interest in physical property which it protects within its borders? Logically this
argument is somewhat impressive, but deductions from the premises of a practical subject like taxation can in constitutional law
rarely bei pushed to their apparently logical extremes. The situs
of property for taxation of various sorts, particularly the situs of
such artificial intangibles as are created by the ingenuity of.modern
business organization, must in a measure be governed by considerations of convenience and expediency as well as those of logic, and
such considerations are strongly against the claim above set forth.
If the state could tax the transfer, at death of the interests of nonresident stockholders of a foreign corporation in physical corporate
property in the state, could it not also tax the transfer of such interests by the sale of stock inter vivos between non-residents (though
consummated outside the state), and permit the garnishment of such
interests in suits against non-resident stockholders not served with
process within the state? The same logic seems applicable here.
The truth may well be that business convenience imperatively demands that the transfer of such an interest as that of the stockholder in the corporate property-real though it is-be exclusively
governed by the jurisdictions that control the stockholder or the
3. San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co. (1882) 13 Fed.
722, 746-47.

4. (1885) 116 U.S. 138.

21 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

corporation, and that to attempt to deal otherwise with them is
so unreasonable as to be lacking in due process.
In the principal case a North Carolina statute purported to
levy an inheritance tax upon the shares of stock in foreign corporations owned by non-resident decedents, if at least 50 percent of the
corporate property was located within the state-the taxable value
of such shares being computed at the same proportion of the total
value of such shares as the corporate property within the state bore
to the total corporate property everywhere. In a unanimous opinion
by Chief Justice Taft the decision of the North Carolina supreme
court, 5 upholding the tax, was reversed in favor of the executor of
a Rhode Island decedent who owned stock in a New Jersey corporation, two-thirds of whose corporate property was in North
Carolina. The court said:
"In this case the jurisdiction of North Carolina rests on the claim
that because the New Jersey corporation has two-thirds of its property in North Carolina, the state may treat shares of its stock as having
a situs in North Carolina to the extent of the ratio in value of its property in North Carolina to all of its property. This is on the theory
that the stockholder is the owner of the property of the corporation,
and the state which has jurisdiction of any of the corporate property
has pro tanto jurisdiction of his shares of stock. We cannot concur
in this view. The owner of the shares of stock in a company is not
the owner of the corporation's property. He has a right to his share
in the earnings of the corporation, as they may be declared in dividends,
arising from the use of all its property. In the dissolution of the corporation he may take his aliquot share in what is left, after all the
debts of the corporation have been paid, and the assets have been
divided in accordance with the
law of its creation. But he does not
6
own the corporate lroperty.")

This disposition of the matter seems almost too simple in view
of what can be said to the contrary, but it is believed that the decision may be sustained by the argument outlined above, if not entirely
satisfactorily by the reasoning of the court. A similar result, either
upon constitutional or statutory grounds, has been reached in cases
cited by the court from Massachusetts, Illinois, Idaho, Montana,
Oklahoma, and Wisconsin, the leading one being Tyler v. Dane
Cou*zty, Wisconsin (1923) 289'Fed. 843. In its effect the case
affords another welcome check upon the too frequent practice of
multiple taxation of transfers at death.
JAMES P. HALL.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FUTURE INTERESTS-RIGHT OF LEGISLATURE TO TAKE AWAY INCHOATE RIGHT TO DESTROY CONTINGENT REMAINDER-WHAT

Is

AN INCHOATE

RIGHT?-THE

MES-

ONOMiC RELATIONSHIP- [Illinois]
The Illinois case of Jennings
et ux. v. Capen at al.' announces no new or surprising doctrine but

5. (1924) 187 N.C. 263, 121 S.E. 741.
6. 46 S. Ct. at 258.
1. 151 N. E. 900.

